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In late 1992, as it became clear that the two great South African armies locked 
in political combat—the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic 
Movement on the one hand, and the forces of the apartheid state and capital on 
the other—could not budge one another, a compromise was required. After 
much blood was shed, the deal arrived at contained two essential elements. 
First, at the political level, “Sunset Clauses” (September 1992) and a highly 
constrained Interim Constitution (November 1993) paved the way for a 
Government of National Unity, for an excessive degree of federalism 
(devolution of responsibilities to a largely new provincial tier of government), 
for job guarantees that protected apartheid-era civil servants, and for a 
municipal electoral system that gave white voters an effective triple weight in 
elections as well as veto power over local council decisions if they held as little 
as one-third of the council votes. 
 The second part of the transitional compromise was the 
implementation of free-market (in the SA context, known as “neoliberal”) 
economic policies, both nationally and locally. The national policies were 
remarkably consistent between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, entailing the 
highest interest rates in the country’s history, progressive relaxation of exchange 
and trade controls, other forms of deregulation and privatization, fiscal 
conservatism, and a growing orientation to cost-recovery approaches (and 
lower subsidies) toward most state-provided social services (Marais 1998; Bond 
2000a). 
 Locally, for South Africa’s 843 municipalities, neoliberalism meant 
intensifying budget constraints, cost-recovery principles, lower levels of services 
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(e.g., pit latrines in new low-income residential developments instead of flush 
toilets) and unprecedented cutoffs of services (including water and electricity) 
to those residents not able to pay their municipal bills. The desperate need to 
resolve massive backlogs of basic municipal services—water, sanitation, 
electricity, housing, roads and stormwater drainage, streetlights, rubbish 
removal, recreational facilities, even clinics (sometimes the responsibility of a 
municipality)—was sacrificed on the altar of fiscal discipline. (As many as half 
the municipalities were officially anticipated to be so fiscally unviable that by 
2002 they would be declared bankrupt and merged into larger rural district 
councils.) This condition, in turn, led to a fascination, beginning in the early 
1990s under late-apartheid municipal managers but intensifying under the new 
government, with municipal privatization. 
 This was an important moment, for at the same time a relatively new 
phenomenon was maturing: Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in the fields 
of water and other municipal services were scanning the globe for sites of 
municipal investment and management opportunities, where takeover of 
municipal waterworks would allow dramatic retrenchments of civil servants, 
dramatic increases in water tariffs, and the opportunity for healthy profits 
(typically 30 percent in US$ terms, according to the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation) (Bond 2000b: chapter 4). 
 Thus the late-apartheid regime as well as a conservative bloc from the 
new ANC government (largely located in national government’s Department of 
Constitutional Development), working closely with TNCs and their 
international boosters (especially the World Bank, as well as international 
merchant banks), began introducing municipal privatization by stealth. Small 
towns in the impoverished Eastern Cape Province were the first targets (1992–
96), followed by medium-sized towns like the Mpumalanga Province capital city 
of Nelspruit (1996–99), and then the country’s largest metropolis, 
Johannesburg (1999). All faced commercialization and privatization of key 
functions. However, arrayed against the TNCs, the conservative forces in 
government, and key municipal bureaucrats are new alliances of unions and 
communities that have fought the commodification and privatization of 
municipal services to, so far, a standstill. 
 Indeed, the privatizers have been surprised at the depth and resilience 
of opposition. In even small Eastern Cape towns, and certainly in Nelspruit and 
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Johannesburg, crucial battles are being fought, with the South African 
Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) playing a leading role. In turn, this 
struggle has begun to define radical politics within the trade union movement 
as a whole, and within South Africa’s major progressive forces more broadly. 
SAMWU declared “war” on privatization in 1997, on grounds that the water 
and waste service contracts signed during the 1990s are part of a wider scheme 
by the multinationals to obtain lucrative contracts to control all viable municipal 
services in South Africa (Mail and Guardian, April 1, 1997). SAMWU has also 
internationalized the antiprivatization struggle via its relations with Public 
Services International, the global public-sector workers union federation. Since 
most of the privatizers are TNCs, SAMWU is also playing a major role at the 
international level in forging resistance. 
 This article traces the ebb and flow of municipal fiscal crisis, 
investment strategies, pricing and related issues, and the politics of resistance. 
The conclusion confirms that South Africa remains an inspiring setting to 
consider the deeper meanings of democracy and to assess how people translate 
local grievances into political activism. 
 
THE EASTERN CAPE WEDGE 
 
The TNCs deserve much closer attention in understanding post-apartheid 
urban landscapes, for in many respects South Africa’s municipal privatization 
has been a “supply-side”–led phenomenon. A French expert on municipal 
services, Dominique Lorrain, argues that TNCs use a low-risk, trial-marriage 
approach at the outset. They also acquire participation in domestic firms 
(Lyonnaise des Eaux, for example, forged a consortium—called Water and 
Sanitation South Africa (WSSA)—with a huge SA construction company, 
Group Five) in order to “become accustomed to the country, thereby acquiring 
assurance” (Lorrain 1997). Even when not initially profitable, this kind of “loss-
leader” strategy fits into regional strategies with the larger cities as the key prize. 
In competing for the big contracts, smaller ones may end up underwriting 
larger ones where more substantial cost reductions may be offered to win such 
large contracts (Marvin & Guy 1997). 
 In some of the most impoverished and remote areas of South Africa, 
TNC water companies set down roots. In Fort Beaufort, a town of 35,000 
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residents in the middle of the Eastern Cape, the world’s biggest water company, 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, runs a tiny water/sanitation system whose 32 workers 
service 3,400 house connections (mainly in the formerly white areas) and a late 
19th-century “bucket system” in Bhofolo township. By all accounts, this 
inherited sanitation system—which relies on workers going house-to-house, 
emptying buckets of night soil by hand—is one of the most unhealthy and 
undignified legacies of apartheid. As government itself has put it, 
 
The history of the development of sanitation services closely 
parallels the history of water service development in South Africa. 
In the wealthy municipalities and towns the development of water 
supplies generally made provision for the greater quantities of water 
required for water-borne sewage services. Black local authorities in 
some areas undertook water borne sewage development but in 
many places the bucket system is still used today. In rural areas the 
situation is even worse with very low levels of service provision. 
The impact that this state of affairs has had on the health of the 
population and on the environment at large is enormous…Bucket 
systems of sanitation are not considered as adequate from either a 
health perspective or in terms of community acceptability. They 
should be phased out over a period of five years throughout the 
country (Water and Sanitation White Paper, DWAF 1994). 
 
In Bhofolo township, sanitation has not improved since liberation in 1994. 
Buckets are collected just once a week, after they have overflowed. The local 
SA National Civic Organization branch complains that after they are emptied at 
the nearby sewerage plant, they are not properly sanitized. Back in Bhofolo, 
they are stored in the open, in the WSSA’s backyard. The building where 
buckets are stored also serves as an area where workers congregate. Buckets 
have no lids. Likewise, the WSSA Customer Service Center in Bhofolo is a 
hazardous and unsanitary place. On the east side fence of the WSSA property, 
there are furrows of septic sewage—a moat that obstructs consumers 
approaching from the east side. Worse still, old-age pensioners in long queues 
spend several hours every month at this service center, which doubles as a 
pension payout point. Two tractors constantly drive around the township, 
further eroding the decaying dirt roads as they collect the night-soil buckets. 
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 The TNC strategy in maintaining archaic systems of this sort is logical. 
Companies like Lyonnaise des Eaux begin operations by using existing 
municipal facilities (the customer center is provided to them for free). Second, 
they regionalize the work and cut their overheads. Key WSSA personnel rove 
between Stutterheim, Fort Beaufort, and Queenstown. The company benefits 
from regional economies of scale and mobilities, while dealing with each 
municipal authority independently. The regional and area managers appear to 
function as a mobile team, while unskilled workers are more or less immobile. 
The company has cut costs even further by intensifying and speeding up the 
various municipal labor processes, and deploying technical workers across a 
wider regional space. This is not unusual, according to Green (1994:78–79): 
“An Australian study showed that companies reduce costs by up to 30% by 
using multi-skilled workers, cutting overheads scheduling all maintenance work, 
and cutting down on travel time by faxing instruction to technicians so that 
they do not have to come to the depot.” 
 While this approach may be cost-effective to Lyonnaise des 
Eaux/WSSA, it may not be so for the community. Indeed, the TNCs face a 
formidable problem in getting low-income black consumers to pay rising 
municipal services bills. In the model Eastern Cape town of Stutterheim, for 
example, nonpayment of services led to the municipality cutting off the water 
supply to 20 percent of all black township households during the last quarter of 
1997 (Bond 1999b: chapter 5). As a community leader of the SA National Civic 
Organization (SANCO) branch put it, “We have little hard information on the 
WSSA. We thought WSSA was a black company, now we see it is a giant 
company. We don’t know if there is a dispute resolution clause in the contract. 
We don’t know if there is any monitoring of water quality.” In addition to the 
tariffs charged for largely unimproved services, explicit complaints included 
lack of consultation by WSSA with community structures; confusion over 
responsibility for leaks in the water system, with many customers told to do 
repairs themselves or hire private plumbers; lack of accountability more 
generally; lack of transparency with respect to the municipal contract; and 
concern over WSSA’s unilateral power to fire workers. 
 Municipal workers have had a much harder time on the job since the 
advent of privatization. The Eastern Cape regional SAMWU organizer 
observed that, 
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promises of better conditions with WSSA were made in 1995, but 
have not been fulfilled. In fact, they said they would never pay less 
than the municipalities. But they did pay lower wages—leading to a 
work stoppage and threats of legal proceedings against WSSA. At that 
point the company agreed to equalize payments. After a one-day 
strike, WSSA agreed to fix the problem. But no back pay for the 
period when they paid lower than municipal-level wages has been 
offered. (Interview, M. Melitafa, December 4, 1998) 
 
Shop stewards in Fort Beaufort report a variety of problems, including a 
downsizing program based on attrition and problems with pension payments to 
retiring workers. Commenting on the staff-workload ratio, a senior municipal 
official remarked that 
 
I personally feel that they [WSSA] need more staff members. These 
people definitely work hard day and night—honestly it demands a lot 
of determination because they are understaffed—but it is clear that 
they do not have enough people to render adequate services. They 
have not budgeted for new places. (Interview, anonymous Fort 
Beaufort official, December 4, 1998) 
 
These problems parallel the experiences of water privatization elsewhere in the 





Since World War I, Lyonnaise des Eaux has had strong colonial ties, with 
extensive business in North Africa (especially Morocco and Tunisia) and 
Central Africa (Togo and Congo). The firm extended its interests into gas, 
public lighting, and electricity generation and distribution until French gas and 
electricity were nationalized in 1946. France’s two major water companies 
served the most profitable cities and neglected the small towns and poor 
districts. The latter districts required state subsidies, sourced mainly from a 
gambling levy (Goubert 1989:182–83). 
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 In 1967, the Compagnie Financiere de Suez bank bought Lyonnaise 
des Eaux, giving it interlocking connections with other banks, insurance 
companies, and political interests. In 1972, Lyonnaise des Eaux acquired 
Degremont and in 1979, the waste management firm Sita. During the 1980s, 
Lyonnaise des Eaux expanded even more rapidly, acquiring controlling stakes 
in U.K., Spanish, and U.S. firms. In 1987, it took over the Société Générale de 
Belgique bank. In 1990, it merged with Dumez, refocusing activity on financial 
and industrial services, and in 1993 it won water supply contracts in Buenos 
Aires, Rostock, and Sydney (among the largest such deals in the world). In 
1995, Lyonnaise des Eaux reorganized its construction-sector interests, and also 
became the leading cable television operator in France. Since 1997 the company 
has won additional water concessions in the Philippines, Indonesia, China, 
Vietnam, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Morocco, Hungary, Romania, 
Germany, and the United States. By 1998, it employed close to 200,000 workers 
across the globe and had assets of more than $15 billion (Lyonnaise des Eaux 
website). 
 Lyonnaise des Eaux also owns 25 percent of another large firm, Aguas 
de Barcelona. This axis typically competes for contracts against one other major 
alliance: Générale des Eaux (now known as Vivendi) and Thames Water. 
Générale des Eaux has some 215,000 employees worldwide, and markets a 
wide range of services: water and sanitation, energy, waste disposal, 
construction, bus transport, health services, heating, cable television, mobile 
phones, and catering. A few other smaller companies include SAUR (a French 
company) and the British companies Anglian Water, North West Water, 
Biwater, and Severn Trent (Public Services International Privatization Research 
Unit 1996). 
 Hemson’s (1997) international literature review of privatizers’ practices 
included these findings: 
 
corruption in the tendering and drawing up of contracts, particularly 
in the US; monopoly in the privatized service; higher user charges; 
inflated director’s fees, share options, and management salaries; 
widescale retrenchments; and anti-union policies ... The effects of 
privatization bear most radically on the poorest in the community; 
there is widespread evidence of more cut-offs in service and generally 
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a harsher attitude towards low-income “customers.” Water in Britain 
is a case in point. Water and sewerage bills have increased by an 
average of 67 percent between 1989/90 and 1994/95, and during 
roughly the same period the rate of disconnections due to non-
payment by 177 percent. The inflexibility and hostility which often 
characterized public utilities’ attitude towards non-payment has, over 
the same period, been replaced by an emphasis on pre-payment 
meters and “self- disconnection” as public goods have been 
commodified. Pre-payment metering is greatly advantageous to 
companies as the problem of poorer customers is avoided, there is a 
continuous revenue stream in advance of consumption, less of a 
“political” problem in confronting disconnections, and better form of 
debt recovery. Self-disconnection is associated with the reduction of 
consumption below the level consistent with health, safety and 
participation in normal community life. Studies have shown a 
surprisingly high number of self-disconnections of water supply for 
various periods by as much as 49 percent by those using pre-payment 
devices over a trial period. The most critical feature of privatization, 
however, has been that cross-subsidies are rooted out after 
privatization: those who need costly help have to pay for these 
services directly themselves ... Rather than cross-subsidies there has 
been the introduction of “cost-reflective” pricing (in which prices 
reflect the particular costs associated with a particular customer). This 
will end with greater differences in regional charges, the poorer 
paying more, and better off people with cheque accounts paying less 
with direct debits. 
 
In South Africa, Lyonnaise des Eaux was a long-time beneficiary of apartheid 
business links through its subsidiaries Aqua-Gold and Degremont. Its initial 
water supply contracts were mainly with the homeland governments of 
KwaZulu (as early as 1987), Bophuthatswana, and Kangwane, and various 
mining companies. In 1992 a water supply contract was signed between Aqua-
Gold and the Queenstown municipality (still controlled by apartheid-era 
bureaucrats).  
 Companies like WSSA promised to “render an affordable, cost 
affective and optimized service, implement effective consumer management,” 
and ensure that customers are “willing and able to pay for services, while 
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maximizing revenue collection” (WSSA 1995a:1). Benefits also allegedly include 
“a more dynamic business environment, increased productive investment, 
workplace democratization, cooperation with small and micro enterprise, and 
more open and flexible management styles” (WSSA 1995b:1). Yet in practice, in 
the Stutterheim pilot, water services were instead characterized by WSSA’s 
failure to serve any of the 80 percent of the region’s township residents (classic 
cherry-picking), mass cutoffs of water by the municipalities of township 
residents who could not afford payment, and the cooption of the main civic 
leader into WSSA’s employ, thus effectively rendering silent any community 
protest (Bond 1999a: chapter 5). 
 WSSA is clearly trying to win a strong position in the local water 
market, and also intends to use South Africa as its base for making inroads into 
other countries in the region. However, in both ambitions it faces strong 
competition from other transnationals. While it bid for the water concessions in 
Nelspruit, Mpumalanga, and Dolphin Coast in KwaZulu Natal, it was beaten in 
both cases. Biwater is the preferred bidder in Nelspruit, while SAUR’s Siza 
Water Company consortium won the Dolphin Coast bid. 
 Regardless of competition, the two key struggles for the privatizers 
remain battling union/community opposition, and ensuring that the state 
serves their interests. This was by no means guaranteed, but by 1996, as one of 
WSSA’s South African  partners happily concluded, “Whilst these are early days 
in winning their acceptance, we now have the support of the (ANC) 
government. We helped draw guidelines on private sector management of 
water and sanitation services and are now helping with a regulatory framework” 
(Everite 1996). WSSA has also actively promoted the concept of delegated 
management in municipalities around the country—holding regular seminars in 
different centers on the concept of delegated management and water 
concession projects. To assess whether concern about such potential “captive 




Lead bureaucrats within the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) and the Department of Constitutional Development (DCD) began 
pushing a privatization agenda beginning in 1995. In 1996, DWAF’s 
 




Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
9 
Community Water Supply and Sanitation program commissioned several dozen 
extremely small-scale, rural build-operate-train-and-transfer contracts, involving 
NGOs and some private firms. But such serious problems soon emerged—
unsustainability, lack of consumer affordability given cost-recovery pricing 
policy, poor technical design, poor community control functions, mismatched 
NGO/private-sector roles and expectations, systematic inconsistencies with 
neighboring government-subsidized water schemes, and lack of training and 
transfer prospects—that by 1999, the concept was in many areas evaluated as a 
“failure” with respect to implementation by DWAF and DCD—whereby 
according to Masia et al. (1998:11), “The gaps between practice and policy have 
to be addressed head on lest the policies be invalidated”—and by its favored 
NGO implementing agency, the Mvula Trust (Bakker 1998). 
 Nevertheless, DCD encouraged larger municipalities to contract out 
infrastructure- related services to the private sector using what were initially 
called Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), for which in 1997 the DCD issued 
guidelines and helped establish a Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit 
based at the Development Bank of Southern Africa. This was followed by 
DCD’s draft regulatory framework in August 1998, in which PPPs were 
rebaptized as Municipal Service Partnerships (MSPs) and characterized as “a 
variety of risk-sharing structures within public-public, public-private and public-
NGO/CBO partnerships” (DCD 1998:v). By December 1998, the South 
African Local Government Association and DCD had negotiated a Municipal 
Framework Agreement with unions. 
 Thus within about four years of the advent of democracy, key political 
decision makers within the South African state—at national and local levels—
had been won over to what effectively amounted to creeping privatization of 
core local services: rubbish removal, water works, and even municipal electricity 
supply. The primary advocates of privatization were the World Bank and its 
private-sector investment arm, the International Finance Corporation (which in 
1997 announced a $25 million investment in Standard Bank’s South Africa 
Infrastructure Fund, an explicit privatization financing vehicle), as well as local 
and international firms. By 1997, Banque Paribas, Rand Merchant Bank, 
Colechurch International, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, Générale 
des Eaux, Metsi a Sechaba Holdings, Sauer International, and Lyonnaise Water 
had all met with officials of South Africa’s fourth largest city, Port Elizabeth, 
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for example, in the wake of a week-long 1996 World Bank study of the 
council’s waterworks which suggested just one policy option: full privatization 
(Port Elizabeth Municipality 1998; Bond 1999a: chapter 4). 
 The February 1998 Local Government White Paper endorsed 
privatization, while acknowledging the risks of cherry-picking (refusal to 
provide services to low-income areas), poor quality services, and unfair labor 
practices. A virtually unstoppable momentum had built up by 1999, supported 
by a R30 million USAID grant to DCD for the development of PPP business 
plans in various towns. These included Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and 
Stellenbosh (where water and sanitation were reviewed by 1999), the 
Johannesburg suburb of Benoni (fire and emergency services), and several 
towns where refuse removal would be privatized. (In Cape Town’s Khayelitsha 
township, the Billy Hattingh private rubbish removal scheme was so 
unsuccessful that by 1999, municipal workers had to be redeployed to back up 
the company.) 
 These early PPPs suggest a penchant for long-term management 
contracts, entailing “delegation” of defined municipal functions for a ten, 
twenty-five, or thirty year period. They include operation, rehabilitation, 
maintenance, customer services, and expansion of assets, which are, however, 
still owned by the municipalities. Contracts are flexible, allowing for the 
company to extend or upgrade facilities but with municipal or noncompany 
finances. Unlike concession contracts, they involve less greenfield investment 
(such as extension of services to townships) and hence far lower risks for the 
successful bidder. 
 DCD considered some of the pilots too conservative, if anything, for 
failing to promote sufficient concessions to assure increased capital 
investments. DCD officials identified constraints in the forms of legal obstacles 
and uncertainties with respect to contractual issues, tendering procedures, 
contract monitoring requirements, and dispute resolution procedures. By 1997, 
management contracts were said to be “only advisable when more ambitious 
forms of private participation are considered undesirable” (DCD 1997). The 
suspicion was, simply, that “contractors with international linkages might 
engage in management contracts in order to secure a privileged position in 
subsequent initiatives” rather than for the sake of providing optimum services, 
with the effect of “sabotaging open competition.” 
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 Having raised these concerns, DCD’s Draft Guidelines for MSPs then 
proceeded to diminish the role of municipal workers by insisting that “a 
municipality must consult, but is not obligated to negotiate and reach 
agreement regarding the labour aspects of the transfer with employees or 
unions as a condition for being authorized to proceed with the transfer” (DCD 
1998:48). Yet, the reality was that SAMWU has been so effective in generating 
public opposition to DCD’s plan and to participation by the British firm 
Biwater (the lead company behind Nelspruit’s water contract), that, as SAMWU 
described it, “In December 1998, the Congress of SA Trade Unions and 
SAMWU signed a framework agreement with the local government employer 
body, SA Local Government Association around municipal service 
partnerships. The agreement was the product of months of negotiations. It 
concurs with national legislation that the public sector is the preferred deliverer 
of services and specifies that involvement of the private sector in service 
delivery should only be a very last resort—if there is no public sector provider 
willing or able to provide the service” (Weekes 1999:1). This major concession 
by DCD was the result of several years of intensified anti-privatization 
organizing by the union. 
 
WORKERS STRIKE BACK 
 
The South African Municipal Workers Union and the Independent Municipal 
Workers and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) have both expressed opposition to 
the privatization of municipal services, but with differing degrees of militancy 
and different strategies. SAMWU has campaigned actively at national and 
municipal levels, and its aggressive approach to defending members’ jobs as 
well as addressing community issues is one reason that it emerged from the 
apartheid state as a left-leaning, fast-growing union. From 1991 to 1996, its 
membership soared from 60,000 to 112,000. Unique among unions, SAMWU 
has a membership geographically spread across the entire country, in most of 
South Africa’s 843 municipalities. 
 The average income of a SAMWU member is under R1,400 (US$220) 
per month, roughly half the poverty line for a family of four. Its main 
campaigns have been wage- and benefit-related, and SAMWU’s local-level 
battles during the 1990s eventually won the union an opportunity for central 
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bargaining (with the South African Local Government Association). The main 
competing union, IMATU, is made up mostly of supervisors, while SAMWU’s 
concentration is on laborers. 
 Organizationally, SAMWU still struggles to build its base in many 
difficult local settings. In dispersed small towns such as in the Eastern Cape, 
SAMWU “shopsteward structures are generally less developed than comparable 
sized firms in the private sector, although according to managers, there is a 
stronger tradition of solidarity and accountability among workers in lower job 
categories and hence within SAMWU structures,” according to Klerck 
(1997:59). SAMWU’s other great strength is its close relationship to black 
communities, as meter readers and service workers remain in regular contact 
with residents. This made it logical for the union to campaign against 
privatization with the companion slogan, “50 Free Liters of Water per Person 
per Day Free!” 
 SAMWU operates on the left flank of the South African union 
movement, while in contrast some allies’ investment companies (such as in 
railroads, air transport, and tourism) have begun to buy shares in partially 
privatized state entities. But the SAMWU campaign fits well within the broader 
self-interest of workers, as reflected in a speech to the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions Central Committee on June 23, 1998 by federation 
general secretary Mbhazima Shilowa: 
 
The working class should reject assertions, which are aimed at 
ensuring that we accept the agenda of multinationals, financial 
markets, and the G-7 as inevitable. Accepting their assertions is 
tantamount to accepting that capitalism can solve the problems of 
society. The reality is that most of our problems stem from the ills of 
capitalism. As South Africans, we do want trade with the outside 
world. However, unlike these converts of the markets, we want not 
only free trade, but fair trade. The same goes for those who are 
unemployed. They do want jobs. It is, however, a fallacy perpetuated 
by business that they want any type of job, irrespective of wages and 
other basic conditions of employment on offer. We have to assert the 
right of workers to better quality jobs at a living wage. In this way, we 
will ensure that South African workers do not become economic 
slaves in the name of job creation. We need to intensify our support 
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for socialism. Our policies as a trade union must be guided by our 
long-term vision. Even where compromises are made, they should 
not undermine our socialist agenda. 
 
Union resistance has been effective in slowing down, not stopping, the process 
of privatization at local government level. It has also forced the government to 
change its strategies for public-private partnerships. In Nelspruit, SAMWU and 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions, along with more advanced civic 
groups and local branches of the South African Communist Party and ANC 
Youth League, were effective in generating public opposition to a consortium 
led by Biwater (which included unaccountable investment arms of the South 
African NGO Coalition and the South African National Civic Organization), 
but in March 1999 a contract was formally signed. 
 One of the main hopes for revisiting that contract and preventing 
others from coming to fruition, is to force the South African state to more 
explicitly confront its strategy in relation to basic principles. Here, SAMWU has 
argued (and won concessions in the Municipal Framework Agreement) that the 
“public good” character of water should entail a broader appreciation by service 
providers of the social and economic benefits (not realizable by a private firm) 
that flow from water access, such as better public health, a better environment, 
increased gender equality, and more economic opportunities (Bond 1999b: 
chapter 3). This is one part of the debate that looms ahead, and that may be 
decided based on revisiting the very principles behind privatization of 
municipal services. 
 
ASSESSING PRIVATIZATION IN PRINCIPLE 
 
Is there, as is so often sought in 1990s South Africa, a negotiated settlement 
ahead? Can regulation solve the problems associated with municipal services 
privatization in local and international experiences? 
 Probably not, given the classical advantages associated with a public 
good’s “natural monopoly,” namely, the ability of a state institution to pass 
along implementation responsibilities while still holding control over basic 
services policy (e.g., on coverage, quality, access, cost, labor conditions, etc, all 
of which the private sector would ordinarily skimp on to the public’s 
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detriment). The propensity of a private firm to, for example, provide cross-
subsidies and lifeline tariffs, is extremely low, as a World Bank water expert 
(Roome 1995:50–51) explicitly warned Water Minister Kader Asmal in 1995—
since sliding-scale tariffs favoring low-volume users “may limit options with 
respect to tertiary providers ... in particular private concessions [would be] 
much harder to establish”—as part of a lobbying campaign to dissuade him 
from invoking cross-subsidies. 
 The extent to which a natual public monopoly is replaced by a private 
one--oblivious to the prospects for identifying public-good social benefits--
gives rise to yet more concern. In late 1998, Lyonnaise des Eaux announced 
plans to establish multipurpose utility monopolies covering water, sanitation, 
refuse, roads, cable TV, and telephones, to be payable through a single bill, with 
the city of Casablanca already witnessing the firm’s pilot linkage of several 
privatized municipal services. Aware of this possibility, DCD (1998:56) 
acknowledged that “The Competition Bill [of mid-1998] could create 
opportunities for consumers of municipal services to challenge various aspects 
of an MSP including tariff structures, tariff setting mechanisms and grants of 
monopoly rights to a service provider in both administrative and judicial 
forums”—but reassures firms that “the power of the Competition Tribunal to 
award costs to a respondent against whom a finding has been made may act to 
restrain consumers from initiating complaints.” 
 In other countries (beginning with Paris in 1985), the privatization of 
water was at the very least done in a manner that deliberately distinguished retail 
provision from distribution, and also established geographical divides (the Left 
Bank going to Lyonnaise des Eaux and the Right Bank to Générale des Eaux), 
thus allowing “for a compromise where there is still outside competition and 
larger markets beckon” (Lorrain 1997:117). Indeed, this raises the question of 
whether water and energy should be managed at a local or regional level (i.e., 
along politico-administrative boundaries) or based on geological, 
watershed/basin, or functional divides. Moreover, if water supply is separated 
from sewerage and roads, there is bound to be confusion, dislocation, and 
diminished accountability. By fragmenting responsibility for road works, refuse 
removal, and sanitation, residents will have to visit different company offices to 
register complaints, increasing the bureaucratic hurdles for consumers. 
 The thorniest questions are those bound up in politics and corruption, 
 




Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
15 
and hence are least transparently considered in DCD and other official work. 
Many of the transnational services firms have dubious track records, and not 
just in the notorious kickbacks and bribes associated with privatization in 
Eastern Europe, Indonesia, and the like. Even in France, the mayor of the city 
of Grenoble was imprisoned for taking bribes from Lyonnaise des Eaux and its 
local partner (Barsoux 1997:16). In apartheid-era South Africa, WSSA’s close 
association with repressive, corrupt bantustan regimes does not prove 
corruption in a commercial sense, but does show that unlike many other 
companies which disinvested, the French chose not only to stay but to 
accelerate their dealings with the most discredited elements of the apartheid 
regime. In several towns, WSSA signed agreements with unrepresentative white 
politicians and municipal administrations prior to democratic elections, and 
without going through a tender process (DCD 1998). 
 Finally, if the “basic rationale” for privatization is that “MSP projects 
can save or avoid municipal expenditures” (DCD 1998:74), it should also be 
considered that a municipality has enormous burdens once a contract is signed: 
monitoring the concessionaire or contractor; undertaking expensive litigation in 
the event of disputes; establishing reliable, independent sources of information; 
and bearing the political and financial costs of failure. Typically, the 




The struggle against apartheid was both a struggle against the politico-juridical 
system of racism and for improved quality of life. Improved residential 
infrastructure and service delivery are among the most crucial objectives of 
public policy, by all accounts. Many of the aspirations and concrete demands of 
South Africa’s oppressed peoples are reflected in the 1994 Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP) and the 1996 Constitution--in particular, the 
entitlement to decent standards of services. 
 Despite this mandate to govern, there has been a clear continuity of 
policy between the late-apartheid era and democracy. Some key common 
features are an often untransformed bureaucracy, white consultants at the nerve 
center of policy making, influence by the World Bank or its proxies, the 
ascendance of a new breed of conservative bureaucrats, and the desire of large 
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international firms to capture potentially lucrative business opportunities in a 
context of deep, widening socioeconomic inequality. Moreover, there is a 
disturbing level of consensus in infrastructure-related departments and agencies 
that (1) users pay, (2) standards should be relatively low, and (3) privatization 
should be regularized. 
 Is an alternative to privatized municipal service delivery possible? One 
proposal advocated by social-change activists from community organizations 
and associated NGOs, compatible with the Constitution and RDP, was a 
universal free lifeline to all South African consumers for the first block of water 
(50 liters of water per person each day) and electricity (approximately 1 kilowatt 
hour per day) with steeply rising prices for subsequent consumption blocks. 
There would be no need, in this policy framework, for means-testing or a 
complex administrative apparatus, nor would complete service cutoffs feature. 
Recurrent consumption expenses would be paid for entirely from within each 
sector, although an additional 10 percent expenditure would be needed, beyond 
what has already been budgeted, to finance the added capital costs (totaling 
R120 billion over ten years, a reasonable investment in relation to late 1990s 
GDP of R600 billion and an annual state budget of R200 billion). 
 Where social-change advocates have come up short, however, is in 
turning an extensive series of mid- and late 1990s riots over municipal 
services—which, tragically, included the assassination of an ANC mayor known 
for his willingness to cut off power and water, as well as the burning of several 
ANC councilors’ houses—into more sustained, constructive political pressure 
(this partly reflected the demobilization of the national “civic association” 
movement during the late 1990s). In contrast to an alliance between DCD and 
the big business lobby within the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (the stakeholder forum at which state policies were often 
debated), the progressive forces failed, especially in 1996–97, to successfully 
contest the intensification of services commodification. Notwithstanding firm 
opposition by SAMWU, central government continued to advocate the 
privatization of municipal services. 
 Also at stake in all of this was, as ever, the degree to which a capitalist 
state in league with big business could construct a “social wage” policy 
framework that had, as a central objective, maintaining relatively low upward 
pressure on the private-sector wage floor; in other words, by keeping monthly 
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operating costs of services low through denying workers access to flush toilets, 
hot plates, and heating elements, DCD also reduced the pressures that workers 
would otherwise have to impose upon their employers for wages sufficient for 
the reproduction of labor power. Privatization of services is a corollary of ultra-
commodification at a time the social wage is being slashed. 
 In very practical ways, the labor and social movements were too weak 
to successfully contest the broader neoliberal trajectory, and not even the 
strongest rhetorical and technical critiques could have made up for lack of 
political clout. What looms ahead--as more than half of South Africa’s 
municipalities face formal bankruptcy at the turn of the century due to 
declining central-local grants and low levels of service payments by residents--is 
a stark scenario in which sufficient unpopularity with ANC rule emerges so as 
to generate conditions amenable to a more progressive backlash either within 
the Alliance or, around the time of the 2005 election, the emergence of a left-
wing alternative to the ruling party. Until then, it will be up to activists in civil 
society organizations, probably led by SAMWU in key sites of privatization 
struggles and potentially joined by a nascent alternative civic movement, to 
remind society at large that the transition from late-apartheid to postapartheid 
privatized infrastructure policy is rife with untenable contradictions. 
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